Optimistic update bias increases in older age. by Chowdhury, R et al.
Optimistic update bias increases in older age
R. Chowdhury1,2*, T. Sharot3, T. Wolfe1, E. Düzel1,4,5 and R. J. Dolan2
1 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK
2Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, UK
3Department of Cognitive Perceptual and Brain Sciences, University College London, UK
4Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Institute of Cognitive Neurology and Dementia Research, Magdeburg, Germany
5German Centre for Neurodegenerative Diseases (DZNE), Magdeburg, Germany
Background. Healthy older adults report greater well-being and life satisfaction than their younger counterparts. One
potential explanation for this is enhanced optimism. We tested the inﬂuence of age on optimistic and pessimistic beliefs
about the future and the associated structural neural correlates.
Method. Eighteen young and 18 healthy older adults performed a belief updating paradigm, measuring differences in
updating beliefs for desirable and undesirable information about future negative events. These measures were related to
regional brain volume, focusing on the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) because this region is strongly linked to a posi-
tivity bias in older age.
Results. We demonstrate an age-related reduction in updating beliefs when older adults are faced with undesirable, but
not desirable, information about negative events. This greater ‘update bias’ in older age persisted even after controlling
for a variety of variables including subjective rating scales and poorer overall memory. A structural brain correlate of this
greater ‘update bias’ was evident in greater grey matter volume in the dorsal ACC in older but not in young adults.
Conclusions. We show a greater update bias in healthy older age. The link between this bias and relative volume of the
ACC suggests a shared mechanism with an age-related positivity bias. Older adults frequently have to make important
decisions relating to personal, health and ﬁnancial issues. Our ﬁndings have wider behavioural implications in these con-
texts because an enhanced optimistic update bias may skew such real-world decision making.
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Introduction
Increasing age usually heralds an array of negative
life events including bereavement, reduced social
networks, a decline in physical health and cognitive
function, together with an inevitable time horizon fore-
shortening (Rowe & Kahn, 1987; Hedden & Gabrieli,
2004). Viewed from the perspective of young adult-
hood, a reasonable inference might be that this should
portend an increasing pessimism. Yet older adults
have higher levels of emotional well-being than their
younger counterparts, including a decline in their
experience of negative emotions (Blanchﬂower &
Oswald, 2008; Carstensen et al. 2011; Stone et al. 2010).
In general, many studies show an age-related ‘posi-
tivity effect’ on cognitive processing (for reviews, see
Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Isaacowitz & Blanchard-
Fields, 2012). For example, in comparison to their
younger counterparts, older adults remember faces
displaying positive emotions more than those display-
ing negative emotions (Charles et al. 2003), have
less rich autobiographical memory for negative events
(Comblain et al. 2005) and experience less negative
arousal when anticipating monetary loss (Samanez-
Larkin et al. 2007). Such ﬁndings have been interpreted
within the framework of socio-emotional selectivity
theory, whereby changing time horizons may lead to
modiﬁcation and prioritization of emotionally relevant
goals (Carstensen et al. 1999; Charles & Carstensen,
2010). An alternative account suggests that positivity
may arise serendipitously as a consequence of selective
age-related neurodegeneration (Cacioppo et al. 2011).
Few studies have addressed the effect of age on op-
timism and the results are inconsistent. Optimism has
been deﬁned as the tendency to overestimate future
positive events and underestimate future negative
events (Weinstein, 1980). One such study showed
that older adults had a more optimistic style when ex-
plaining life events (Isaacowitz, 2005) whereas another
found that younger, rather than older, adults had a
more optimistic outlook about the future (Lachman
et al. 2008). A series of studies have investigated
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optimism in young individuals, identifying an asym-
metry whereby beliefs about future negative events
are updated more in response to better than expected
(‘desirable’) information than to worse than expected
(‘undesirable’) information (Sharot et al. 2011, 2012a,b).
Optimism in younger adults seems to be related, at
least in part, to functional activity of the inferior frontal
gyrus (Sharot et al. 2011) and the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) (Sharot et al. 2007). Importantly, a large
body of literature links age-related functional magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) differences in the ACC to a
positivity effect on cognitive processing and greater
emotion regulation with age (Kensinger & Schacter,
2008; Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008; Brassen et al. 2011,
2012; Samanez-Larkin & Carstensen, 2011). Structural
abnormalities of the ACC, in particular the dorsal
ACC, have been identiﬁed in clinical depression,
where pessimism is a core feature (Vasic et al. 2008;
Pizzagalli, 2011). A greater volume of the dorsal, as
opposed to the ventral, subregion has been found in
healthy individuals who show greater cognitive re-
appraisal, a putative mechanism for regulation of emo-
tion (Giuliani et al. 2011). Although ageing is associated
with volumetric changes in frontal brain structures
(Good et al. 2001; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), the re-
lationship between ACC volume and positivity in
older age is unknown.
To determine whether optimistic and pessimistic
belief formation about the future is altered in older
age, we tested young and older healthy adults using a
modiﬁed version of a previously described belief updat-
ing paradigm (Sharot et al. 2011) (Fig. 1). In addition, to
determine whether the volume of the ACC was related
to age-related differences in updating beliefs, we used
structural neuroimaging and a region of interest (ROI)
analysis of the dorsal and ventral subregions together
with an independent whole-brain analysis to identify
the associated structural neural correlates.
Method
Participants
Eighteen younger adults (mean age=22 years, S.D.=
2.29) and 18 older adults (mean age=66 years, S.D. =
5.62), all of whom were healthy and not depressed,
participated in this study (see Online Supplementary
Table S1). Participants were recruited through an ad-
vertisement placed in a local newspaper and by
word of mouth. Written informed consent was ob-
tained from all participants. The study received ethical
approval from the University College London (UCL)
research ethics committee. Older participants were
screened using standardized neuropsychological tests
to ensure their global cognitive function was within
the normal range (see Supplementary Method).
Belief updating task
As shown in Fig. 1, we used a modiﬁed version of the
task by Sharot et al. (2011). The task structure remained
the same and can be summarized as follows: partici-
pants viewed 45 negative events, such as robbery
(4.5 s) (see Supplementary Material for a list of all stim-
uli), and were asked to type on a keyboard their esti-
mate of how likely the event was to occur to them
in the next 5 years (20 s). After a brief ﬁxation cross
(1–2 s), they were presented with the average prob-
ability of this event happening to someone in the gen-
eral population (4.5 s), followed by a further ﬁxation
cross (1–2 s). Immediately after this ﬁrst session, par-
ticipants performed the same task again. We adapted
the task to make it applicable to both young and
older adults as follows. First, all participants were
given longer to input their responses than on pre-
viously run versions of this task. We note that reaction
times did not differ between young and older adults
(see Supplementary Results and Table S2). Second,
we excluded health-related stimuli as they are known
to have very different probabilities across age. Third,
participants were asked to rate how likely events
were to occur to them in the next 5 years to account
for differences between time perspectives in the two
groups. At the end of the study we asked participants
to estimate their lifespan; all participants thought they
would live longer than 5 years, ensuring that they
could imagine the events occurring in their lifetime.
Main behavioural analysis
Belief updating task
The key test in this study was to determine differences
between young and older adults pertaining to chang-
ing their beliefs after being presented with information
that was better or worse than expected. For each sub-
ject, each trial was classiﬁed as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesir-
able’ depending on whether their initial estimate was
higher or lower than the average statistic respectively.
Thus, although all trials involved negative events, par-
ticipants could receive desirable (better than expected)
or undesirable (worse than expected) information for
each event. We then calculated their change in beliefs
(‘update’) as the difference between their ﬁrst and se-
cond estimation (ﬁrst estimation minus second esti-
mation for desirable trials; second estimation minus
ﬁrst estimation for undesirable trials). We could then
examine whether the update differed between desir-
able and undesirable trials, indicating an ‘update
bias’, and whether age affected this bias. For this analy-
sis of update, we used a repeated-measures ANOVA
with valence (desirable/undesirable) as the within-
subjects measure and age group (young/older) as the
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between-subjects measure. To account for potential
confounding variables, the following were included
as covariates in this analysis: differences on all subjec-
tive rating scales, memory errors, ﬁrst estimation error
(i.e. a measure of the initial difference between the sub-
ject’s own estimate and the probability given; see
Table S3), the number of desirable and undesirable
trials, reaction times, IQ and Life Orientation Test –
Revised (LOT-R) scores (a measure of trait optimism).
Memory test and subjective rating scales
After the belief updating task, participants completed a
self-paced memory test in which they were asked to
recall the average probabilities that were presented
previously for all events. Memory errors were cal-
culated as the absolute difference between the average
probability presented previously and the participants’
recollection of that statistical number. Participants
also rated all 45 events on the following subjective
measures using a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to
6 (very): vividness, familiarity, personal experience,
emotional arousal and negativity (Table S4). Subjective
ratings for each measure and memory errors were
analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with
valence (desirable/undesirable) as the within-subjects
factor and age group (young/older) as the between-
subjects factor. We also calculated a difference measure
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 1. Task design. (a) On each trial, participants were presented with one of 45 adverse life events and asked to estimate
how likely this event was to occur to them in the next 5 years. They were then presented with the average probability of that
event occurring to a person similar to themselves in the same sociocultural environment. For each event an estimation error
was calculated as the difference between the participants’ estimation and the average probability provided. The second
session was the same as the ﬁrst session. (b) For each event, an update was calculated as the difference between the
participants’ ﬁrst and second estimations. If the participants’ ﬁrst estimate was higher than the average probability provided,
that trial was classiﬁed as ‘desirable’ because the information presented was better than expected, calling for an adjustment in
an optimistic direction. (c) If the participants’ ﬁrst estimate was lower than the average probability provided, that trial was
classiﬁed as ‘undesirable’ because the information presented was worse than expected, calling for an adjustment in a
pessimistic direction.
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between subjective rating scores for desirable and
undesirable trials to include as covariates in the main
behavioural analysis.
Trait optimism
Participants completed the LOT-R, which provides
a measure of trait optimism (Scheier et al. 1994).
Scores range from 0 (pessimistic) to 24 (optimistic).
Between-age-group differences in trait optimism were
compared using an independent t test. As LOT-R
scores were higher in older adults, we also included
LOT-R scores as a covariate in the main analysis of
updating of beliefs based on desirable or undesirable
information.
Behavioural statistical analysis
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 17.0
(SPSS Inc., USA). The signiﬁcance level for the
ANOVAs was set at p<0.05, two-tailed. We did not
perform corrections for multiple comparisons when
testing for post-hoc differences in memory performance
and subjective ratings because the aim of these analy-
ses was to identify potential confounding factors that
could be added as covariates to our main behavioural
analysis. Thus, by not using Bonferroni corrections,
our analyses were more stringent.
Neuroimaging acquisition
A high-resolution structural MRI data set was acquired
on a 3.0-T Trio MRI scanner (Siemens, Germany) using
a 32-channel head coil (see Supplementary Method for
full details of the sequence protocol). T1-weighted (T1w)
images were segmented into grey matter, white matter
and cerebrospinal ﬂuid (Ashburner & Friston, 2005)
using the New Segment toolbox in SPM8 (http://
www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Using a diffeomorphic re-
gistration algorithm (DARTEL), the grey matter maps
were warped to a common template (Ashburner,
2007). Grey matter maps were modulated, warped to
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space and
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm
full-width at half-maximum using the DARTEL tool-
box ‘Normalize to MNI’ procedure. These smoothed,
warped, modulated T1w images were used in inde-




To compare directly the relationship between ACC
grey matter volume and belief updating in young
and older adults, we used an ROI approach. We
used a bilateral ACC atlas mask, obtained from the
AAL toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002), to limit
the number of statistical tests. Manual segmentation
of this ACC mask into dorsal and ventral subregions
was achieved using ITK-SNAP (Yushkevich et al.
2006), using established guidelines where the ventral
portion was deﬁned by drawing a line in the coronal
plane at the tip of the corpus callosum (Killiany et al.
2000; Giuliani et al. 2011). We performed correlations
between grey matter volume of the dorsal and ventral
ACC and task measures in both age groups (two-tailed
Pearson’s correlations and partial Pearson’s correla-
tions with age, gender and total intracranial volume
as covariates). We focused on the update bias (de-
sirable update minus undesirable update) because
this summary measure best captured the behavioural
difference between age groups. The signiﬁcance level
for these correlations was p<0.0125 (Bonferroni correc-
tion for four tests). Follow-up, post-hoc tests of dorsal
ACC volume were performed using the components
of the update bias (i.e. desirable update and undesir-
able update). For signiﬁcant correlations among older
adults, we tested whether these were signiﬁcantly
stronger in older than young adults using Fisher’s r
to z transformation.
VBM
We performed three exploratory VBM analyses. For all
these analyses, no regions survived a statistical thresh-
old of p<0.05 after whole-brain peak-level family-wise
error correction but, for completeness, we report the
uncorrected results in Tables S5–S9. As no previous
studies have reported the structural correlates of belief
updating, for the ﬁrst analysis (Tables S5–S7) we per-
formed whole-brain VBM analyses across all partici-
pants. Regressors in this multiple regression model
included update for desirable information, update for
undesirable information, and age, gender and total
intracranial volume (TIV, sum of grey matter, white
matter and cerebrospinal ﬂuid) as coviariates of no
interest. In a second analysis (Table S8) we used up-
date bias (desirable update minus undesirable update)
and age, gender and TIV as covariates of no interest
in a full factorial design to identify age interactions of
the update bias (contrasts: update bias young>older
and update bias older>young). The third analysis
(Table S9) involved a conjunction analysis to identify
regions that atrophied with age (contrast: young>
older) and that correlated positively with undesirable
update in young adults (contrast: young undesirable
update>older undesirable update) to address the
speciﬁc hypotheses that an enhanced update bias
may emerge in older age due to age-related volume re-
duction of a region implicated in updating undesirable
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information (hence gender and TIV but not age were
used as covariates of no interest in this model).
Results
Age comparison of updating beliefs
The belief updating task (Fig. 1) was completed by 18
young and 18 older healthy adults. Our results show
both an asymmetry between updating beliefs for desir-
able and undesirable information and a marked
age-related difference in this update bias. Both young
and older subjects displayed an update bias. In other
words participants of all ages updated their beliefs
more for desirable information than undesirable infor-
mation (main effect of update valence: F1,34 =58.29, p<
0.0005). This pattern was evident in 72% of younger
adults and 94% of older adults. Importantly, older
adults had a greater asymmetry in belief updating
than younger adults, indicated by a signiﬁcant inter-
action between update valence (desirable update/
undesirable update) and age group (young/older)
(F1,34 =17.75, p<0.0005). Follow-up tests showed that
this interaction arose because older adults updated
their beliefs for undesirable information even less
than younger adults (t34=3.01, p=0.005), whereas
both age groups updated their beliefs for desirable in-
formation to a similar extent (t34 =1.65, p=0.109), re-
sulting in a greater update bias among older adults
(Fig. 2).
We measured several other variables, and to deter-
mine whether these variables contributed to the age-
related difference in update bias, we included them
all as covariates in the analysis of update bias. First, re-
action times did not differ between age groups (see
Supplementary Results; Table S2). Second, the num-
ber of trials classiﬁed as desirable and undesirable dif-
fered between age groups (number of desirable trials:
young: mean=18, S.D. =5.52; older: mean=13, S.D.=
5.10, t34=−2.92, p=0.006; number of undesirable trials:
young: mean=25, S.D. =5.80; older: mean=30, S.D. =4.53,
t34 =2.88, p=0.007). Third, older adults had a greater
tendency than young adults to initially underestimate
the likelihood of negative events, indicated by a more
negative ﬁrst estimation error (young: mean=−4.71,
S.D. =6.26; older: mean=−12.24, S.D. =6.29; ﬁrst esti-
mation error young versus older: t34=3.60, p=0.001;
Table S3).
Fourth, we tested participants’ recollection for the
average probabilities for each event presented during
the task (Table S4). Older adults made more memory
errors (calculated as the absolute difference between
the average probability for each event and the partici-
pants’ recollection of that number) than younger adults
(main effect of age: F1,35 =9.65, p=0.004). However,
memory errors were similar for trials when desirable
and undesirable information were encountered (main
effect of valence: F1,34=1.44, p=0.238; valence×age in-
teraction: F1,34=0.52, p=0.477).
Fifth, an analysis of subjective rating scales revealed
that all participants rated trials where they received de-
sirable information as more vivid, more familiar and
indicated greater past experience of these events com-
pared to trials where they received undesirable infor-
mation (main effect of valence, vivid: F1,34=86.98;
familiar: F1,34=44.74; experience: F1,34=87.84; all p<
0.0005). All participants rated trials where they re-
ceived undesirable information as more arousing and
more negative than trials where they received desirable
information (main effect of valence, arousal: F1,34=
16.55; negative: F1,34 =20.12; all p<0.0005). An age-
related difference was only present for ratings of arou-
sal (main effect of age: F1,34 =13.89, p=0.001; all other
main effects of age p>0.1) and familiarity (valence×
age interaction: F1,34 =7.49, p=0.010; all other valence×
age interactions p>0.1) (see Supplementary Results). In
fact, older adults rated all events as more emotionally
arousing than younger adults. This would suggest
that the greater update bias in older adults was not
due to participants being less engaged in the task or
ﬁnding the stimuli less relevant than younger adults
did. Familiarity ratings indicated how familiar
Fig. 2. Age comparison of belief updating. Both young and
older adults updated their beliefs (difference between ﬁrst
and second estimate) more when faced with desirable than
undesirable information, but this update bias was larger in
older adults due to reduced updating of undesirable
information. n=18 both groups. Bars ±1 s.E.M. * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.0005.
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participants were with each event regardless of their
personal experience. Here we found a trend towards
older adults rating events in which they received desir-
able information as more familiar than younger adults
(t34=1.82, p=0.078) and no age group difference for
familiarity for events in which they received undesir-
able information (t34=0.08, p=0.939). Overall, the sub-
jective ratings analyses suggest that the task events
were just as salient for older as for young adults and
the relative lack of interactions with age group make
it highly unlikely that these variables accounted for
the age-related difference in the update bias.
Finally, we used the LOT-R self-rating personality
scale as an independent measure of trait optimism
and found that older adults had higher trait optimism
scores (mean=20.17, S.D.=2.88) than young adults
(mean=16.56, S.D.=3.26) (young versus older: t34=3.53,
p=0.001).
To fully account for the differences detailed here,
we added the following measures as covariates to the
analysis of the update bias: IQ, LOT-R score, ﬁrst esti-
mation error, difference measures (desirable minus
undesirable) of all ﬁve subjective rating scales
(vividness, familiarity, experience, emotional arousal,
negativity), difference measures (desirable minus un-
desirable) of reaction times, average memory errors
and number of desirable and undesirable trials. Impor-
tantly, the signiﬁcantly greater update bias in older
adults persisted even when all these factors were in-
cluded as covariates (ANCOVA update, valence×age
interaction: F1,21=8.48, p=0.008).
ACC volume and belief updating
We performed a structural neuroimaging analysis in
relation to our a priori region of interest, the ACC.
Functional activity in this region has been associated
with a positivity effect in older age whereas the re-
lationship between structural volume and positivity
in older age is unknown. We therefore parcellated an
anatomically deﬁned bilateral mask of this region to
obtain grey matter volume of dorsal and ventral
ACC subregions and examined the correlation with
updating beliefs and age group differences. We
found that the volume of both the dorsal and ventral
ACC regions correlated positively with the update
bias in older adults whereas neither region correlated
with update bias in younger adults (Table 1; see also
Table S10). The dorsal ACC correlation in older adults
was signiﬁcantly greater than in young adults (Fisher’s
r to z, z=−1.78, p=0.036), in contrast to the non-
signiﬁcant age group difference for the ventral ACC
(z=−1.42, p=0.078) (Fig. 3). There was no interaction
with region (dorsal ACC versus ventral ACC corre-
lation with update bias) for either older adults
(Fisher’s r to z, z=0.11, p=0.456) or young adults
(Fisher’s r to z, z=−0.26, p=0.397). Greater dorsal
ACC volume also correlated with a higher desirable
update in older adults (Fig. S1) although not after con-
trolling for age, gender and TIV (Table S11). In sum-
mary, the strongest correlation we identiﬁed after
controlling for other variables was between the update
bias and dorsal ACC volume among older adults.
The overall volume of both dorsal (young: mean=
0.45, S.D.=0.032; older: mean=0.42, S.D. =0.036) and
ventral ACC (young: mean=0.54, S.D.=0.037; older:
mean=0.49, S.D.=0.036) was reduced in older age (dor-
sal: t34=−2.55, p=0.015; ventral: t34=−4.08, p<0.0005).
To further assess whether the association between
volumes of ACC subregions and update bias differed
between age groups because of the range of volume
values, we formed age groups matched for volume.
We excluded young adults with dorsal ACC volumes
higher than the maximum volume in older adults
(n=3) and excluded older adults with lower dorsal
ACC volumes than the minimum volume in young
adults (n=4). This did not change the pattern of results,
whereby a strong correlation remained in older adults
(r=0.72, p=0.004) and there remained no correlation
among young adults (r=0.34, p=0.209). Using the
same approach for the ventral ACC, we excluded
young adults with higher ventral ACC volumes than
Table 1. Correlation coefﬁcients (Pearson’s correlations) for the correlation between dorsal and ventral subregions of anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) grey matter volume and update bias (desirable update minus undesirable update)
Older adults Young adults
r p r p
Dorsal ACC 0.649, 0.526 0.004*, 0.044 0.122, 0.057 0.631, 0.841
Ventral ACC 0.626, 0.504 0.005*, 0.056 0.213, 0.262 0.395, 0.345
r=Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient (ﬁrst value in cell) and partial Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient controlling for age, gender
and total intracranial volume (second value in the same cell of the table). p=corresponding signiﬁcance value, *p<0.0125.
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the maximum volume in older adults (n=3) and older
adults with lower ventral ACC volumes than the mini-
mum volume in young adults (n=7). Here, despite the
small sample size, the signiﬁcant correlation persisted
in older adults (r=0.72, p=0.013). Additionally, an
almost signiﬁcant correlation emerged in young adults
(r=0.51, p=0.051). Overall, these results suggest that
individual differences in dorsal ACC volume relate to
the update bias in older adults compared to young
adults despite age-related volume differences.
Overall, our results suggest that a greater relative
volume of the ACC (that is a greater volume among
older adults but not a greater volume independent of
age) is coupled to a greater update bias in older age.
Another potential explanation for the greater update
bias in older age is that the greater failure of older
adults to update undesirable information occurs as a
consequence of age-related brain atrophy. To assess
this we performed an exploratory whole-brain VBM
conjunction analysis (see Method) that identiﬁed clus-
ters in the superior and middle temporal lobe, superior
frontal gyrus and cerebellum, indicating regions that
were both reduced in volume in older adults and cor-
related with undesirable update more in younger
than older adults, yet none of these regions survived
whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons (see
Table S9).
Discussion
We provide evidence that older adults are less likely
than younger adults to change their beliefs when
faced with undesirable information about their future,
resulting in a greater update bias in older age. This
greater asymmetry in belief updating was present
despite older adults experiencing greater subjective
feelings of emotional arousal for all task events. This
update bias was also independent of non-age-related
valence differences in subjective ratings of the task
stimuli, including the sense of personal experience,
vividness, familiarity, emotional arousal and nega-
tivity, whereby all these measures were included as
Fig. 3. Region of interest (ROI) analysis of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Scatter plots show higher volume of the
dorsal ACC (green mask) and ventral ACC (red mask) in older adults correlated with higher update bias (desirable update
minus undesirable update) in older adults. No signiﬁcant correlations were observed in young adults. n=18 for each age
group. * Fisher’s r to z transformation comparing correlation strengths p<0.05.
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covariates in our analyses. The observed age difference
in update bias was not a consequence of a general
memory deﬁcit because there was no age difference
between memory recollection for the average probabil-
ities of desirable and undesirable events and, import-
antly, the interaction between age and the update
bias persisted when overall poorer memory perform-
ance in older age was accounted for in our analysis.
Finally, the greater update bias in older age persisted
after controlling for the enhanced tendency by older
adults to initially underestimate the likelihood of
occurrence of negative events relative to the average
statistics and after controlling for optimistic trait per-
sonality scores.
Our study provides preliminary evidence that a
greater asymmetry in belief updating in older adults
is tightly coupled to the relative volume of the ACC.
Previous studies report a crucial role of the ACC as a
cognitive-emotional interface, although this evidence
has been derived from functional neuroimaging
studies (for reviews, see Bush et al. 2000; Ochsner &
Gross, 2005). We acknowledge that the relationship be-
tween structural and functional changes in the ageing
brain is likely to be complex, yet it is notable that our
structural ﬁndings are broadly in line with studies re-
porting a link between greater functional ACC activity
and more emotional regulation in older age (Brassen
et al. 2011, 2012; Samanez-Larkin & Carstensen,
2011). We show that the volume of the dorsal subre-
gion of ACC was more strongly associated with the
update bias in older than young age. Moreover, even
after matching for the range of volume of ACC sub-
regions across age groups, no correlation emerged in
younger adults between update bias and volume of
the dorsal subregion, suggesting this relationship was
exclusive to older adults. The volume of the dorsal as
opposed to the ventral ACC, often dubbed ‘cognitive’
and affective’ regions respectively (Devinsky et al.
1995; Bush et al. 2000), has in fact been linked to greater
cognitive reappraisal strategies in healthy adults
(Giuliani et al. 2011), and structural volume of this sub-
region is reduced in patients with depression, where
emotional dysregulation and pessimism are highly
characteristic (Vasic et al. 2008). However, functional
activity within the rostral ACC has also been linked
to an optimistic bias in younger adults (Blair et al.
2013) and to greater emotional stability in older adults
(Brassen et al. 2011, 2012). Therefore, it remains a chal-
lenge for future studies to clarify the dissociation
between ACC subregions and positivity effects in
older age.
Intriguingly, we found a positive correlation such
that older adults with greater dorsal ACC volume had
a larger update bias. This was despite an overall age-
related decline in ACC volume, emphasizing that the
link here is between relatively greater volume among
older adults. We speculate that this could indicate
that older adults, when integrating beliefs with experi-
ence, rely more on this region than younger adults.
More generally, this interpretation is in keeping with
the socio-emotional selectivity theory, in which a posi-
tivity bias may be viewed as an enhanced phenom-
enon in older age (Samanez-Larkin & Carstensen,
2011; Nashiro et al. 2012) rather than a ‘side-effect’ of
age-related structural decline as has been proposed,
for example, by the ageing brain model (Cacioppo
et al. 2011).
To explore the latter alternative explanation, we also
performed a whole-brain VBM analysis to determine
whether age-related decline of any other brain regions
was associated with a failure of updating undesirable
beliefs in older age, yet we did not ﬁnd strong evidence
for this. We were alert to the potential role of other
brain structures in belief updating that our ROI ap-
proach would not account for, also motivating ad-
ditional whole-brain VBM analyses. We acknowledge
that the overall lack of signiﬁcant VBM ﬁndings
may have been due to our small sample size and we
do not exclude the possibility that additional mechan-
isms and brain structures may well contribute to the
enhanced update bias in older age. Sociocultural factors
speciﬁc to our cohorts might account for the differ-
ences we found in optimism between our young and
older participants. These are necessarily more difﬁcult
to determine with our cross-sectional design, but we
note that large-scale longitudinal studies have demon-
strated fewer negative emotions in older age (Charles
et al. 2001; Carstensen et al. 2011).
As in the study by Sharot et al. (2011), we only exam-
ined negative events because an update bias here
may have an adverse impact on health-protective
behaviours (Weinstein & Klein, 1995). An optimistic
update bias for positive events has in fact been ob-
served in other studies (Eil & Rao, 2011; Korn et al.
2012). Further study using positive events would be
required to test whether this remains the case in
older age.
In summary, we show that healthy older adults dis-
play an enhanced update bias compared to younger
adults, an effect that correlates with grey matter vol-
ume of the ACC. Our ﬁndings relate to a small sample
of healthy older individuals with a high IQ. A logical
extension of our study would be to examine how IQ
and age-associated pathologies impact on updating
beliefs. One important condition would be later-life de-
pression (Alexopoulos, 2005), where our results have
particular relevance given the link between ACC struc-
ture and the update bias that we highlight, in addition
to reports for an association between structural ACC
abnormalities and clinical depression (Vasic et al. 2008).
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In our ageing society, we provide a timely demon-
stration of an age-related enhancement of the update
bias that has important implications for healthy age-
ing. Optimism has been related to better physical
health (Scheier et al. 1999; Diener & Chan, 2011; Kim
et al. 2011), indicating that an enhanced optimistic up-
date bias may convey adaptive beneﬁts in older age.
For example, an optimistic processing bias may allow
older adults to maintain the same level of happiness
and well-being when faced with the many health and
personal challenges that older age entails, such as
death of loved ones and ﬁnancial difﬁculties. How-
ever, a broad implication of our ﬁndings is that the
presence of such a bias may skew economic, personal
and health-related decisions. For example, older adults
may make inappropriate insurance purchases based on
a false optimism in relation to their future. Indeed, an
age-related increase in risky ﬁnancial decision making
has been described (Samanez-Larkin et al. 2010, 2011),
which could be linked to less updating after losses
(i.e. after worse than expected outcomes) but more
equivalent updating after gains (i.e. after better than
expected outcomes). Thus, our ﬁndings may help to
further elucidate ‘real-world’ decision-making pro-
cesses in healthy ageing.
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